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Introduction 
I first came to Zimbabwe in 1990 on a World Bank mission to participate in a land sub-sector 
study. There was virtual agreement even then among Zimbabweans and the international 
community that land reform needed to be accelerated to redress Zimbabwe’s unequal and 
racially biased land distribution. But, there was also the sense, from my point of view, that 
government, in addition to enabling land reform, was also unwittingly obstructing it through 
excessive centralisation and monopolisation of land acquisition and resettlement (Roth 1993). 
It is not an issue of capacity and skills, for the land administration machinery within 
Zimbabwe has an abundance of both. Rather it is an issue of a patriarchal land administration 
that has asserted far more controls over land allocation, land use, land management and 
resettlement than it can satisfactorily deliver, but it avoids creating space for private market 
solutions that would help complement its own efforts (see also Chigumete, Masendeke).
3 
This chapter aims to synthesise key findings of the research papers and perspectives in this 
volume, and from plenary discussions at the conference, and then proceeds with proposing a 
strategic policy roadmap for reengaging government, donors and civil society in land and 
agrarian reform in Zimbabwe. 
                                            
1 Synthesis presentation prepared for the conference Delivering Land and Securing Rural Livelihoods: 
Post-Independence Land Reform and Resettlement in Zimbabwe held 26-28 March 2003 at the Mont 
Clair hotel, Nyanga. 
2 Michael Roth is senior researcher with the Land Tenure Center, University of Wisconsin-Madison, 
fax: 608-262-2141, email: mjroth@facstaff.wisc.edu. The author gratefully acknowledges the 
financial support of the U.S. Agency for International Development. The author gratefully 
acknowledges the comments of Kudzai Chatiza, Charles Chavunduka, Renson Gasela, Francis 
Gonese, David Hasluck, Daniel Ncube, and Kizito Mazvimavi. However, all views and opinions 
expressed in this paper are solely those of the author unless otherwise cited. 
3 All citations refer to chapters or perspectives in this volume with the exception of references 
included in the bibliography.   2 
Incoherencies 
A number of contradictions in land policy have become evident that confound the coherency 
of Zimbabwe’s land policy framework, most notably: 
  Land reform has been completed according to some in government, yet compulsory land 
acquisitions on the ground continue 
  Land access for the poor has been enhanced by Fast Track, but poor settlers live in a tenure 
void (absent secure property rights) and lack secure livelihoods 
  Deeds registration and survey confers secure rights, but the durability of these rights and the 
utility of the system have been cast in doubt by compulsory acquisition and Fast Track 
occupation 
  Fast Track Land Reform while providing land to new-found beneficiaries has also led to the 
collapse of the private land market that until the late 1990s was successfully redistributing 
land to black emerging farmers, including women (Rugube et al, Petrie et al)
4 
  Results of Fast Track land reform, while applauded by some for helping to redress the land 
question in Zimbabwe, has also created economic regress, agricultural productivity decline, 
severe capital depreciation, disinvestment, and collapse of land values and agricultural 
markets for seed, fertiliser and credit 
  There has been and continues to be subdivision restrictions which have denied the downsizing 
of farms from 400 to several thousand hectares in size based on grounds of economic 
threshold or viability (Sukume and Roth), yet farm size limits have been waived under Fast 
Track resettlement resulting in rapid and sometimes ad hoc fragmentation of commercial 
farms into small parcels 
  Careful beneficiary selection or traits are needed to ensure good land husbandry on model A2 
farms (Mukute, Gonese and Mukora), yet many beneficiaries under Fast Track, who have 
been self-selected, are poor and lack the farm management skills and wherewithal to do little 
more than engage in subsistence agriculture
5 
  Land reform is intended to help equalise land and uplift those in poverty, yet farm workers 
who are among the most impoverished and vulnerable have suffered from displacement, 
destitution, lost employment and violence (Magaramombe)
6 
 
It is these multiple facets of land reform that are polarising the land policy debate in 
Zimbabwe and are creating confusion over intent, motives, and actions on the part of 
government. For it is inconsistency, incoherency and selective application of law that erode 
confidence in government's ability to govern, and to protect individual interests. The land 
                                            
4 Rugube et al documents the collapse of the land and financial bond markets beginning in the 1990s 
but accelerating after the onset of Fast Track. They also show the acceleration of the market for public 
leases as government has begun to unload properties acquired through the 1990s. 
5 According to Daniel Ncube (personal communications), the broad policy of decongesting communal 
lands for resettlement (outside A2 schemes) is administered on a first-come, first-served basis. 
6 Magaramombe notes that while it is not government policy to displace farm workers, the reality on 
the ground is contradictory. There is resurgence of the perception that farm workers are aliens and do 
not warrant equal rights or consideration. Unfortunately, despite lost employment, low levels of 
education make it difficult for them to secure other forms of employment, hence many have been 
driven into poverty.   3 
policy framework is thus in need of reformulation, and the issues above are key starting 
points for considering change. 
Trust 
Decline of trust and loss of confidence in the social and economic order are at the root of the 
economic malaise and agrarian decline in Zimbabwe. It is trust that underpins the foundations 
of property institutions and economic organisation. It is trust that confers tenure security and 
confidence that contractual arrangements will be upheld (see Hasluck, Mukute). Trust is hard 
earned and easily lost, and once lost, is difficult to regain. It is on the basis of trust that 
financial institutions lend money on good faith statements of borrowers that money will be 
repaid, that land and property will have value, and that assets leined can be foreclosed upon 
to repay debt. It is trust that enables lessors and lessees in communal areas and on 
commercial farms to enter into land rental agreements, or to secure access to inputs or 
financial capital through informal credit mechanisms (Hasluck, Hungwe, Nyambara). It is 
trust that allows a commercial farmer or agroprocessor to engage in a contract with 
smallholders, where the farmer/processor is assured that produce will be delivered on time 
and in accordance with quality standards, and the tenant has assurance that s/he will receive 
fair and reasonable compensation for services rendered.  
 
What has been revealed instead (based on a number of papers in this volume and on 
plenary discussions) are numerous symptoms of a breakdown in law and order, in property 
institutions, and in the functioning of agrarian contracts, caused by or connected with loss in 
trust and the ethical foundations for market transactions. Furthermore, an institutional void 
has been created as rules governing land ownership and business dealings are disregarded or 
selectively applied, thus undermining confidence in the economic order. 
 
In the case of rural land transactions and sharecropping in Gokwe, for example, 
Nyambara found that land rental agreements are mainly oral, confined to transactions among 
kin, result in low output shares received by the tenant, and are short term in duration, all 
symptomatic of land tenure insecurity (on the part of the landholder) and lack of sufficient 
trust within the rural farming community. Lack of trust deprives the potential lessor of rental 
income from a land resource that is more efficiently farmed by another, and gives the lessor 
too little incentive to invest in the land or provide sufficient inputs to tenants. It also deprives   4 
the landless and poor of an affordable way to secure land access (beyond land purchase) that 
would otherwise increase access to wealth and secure improved livelihoods.
7 
 
Concerns of tenure security reach beyond land ownership to contract farming that 
theoretically provides smallholders access to higher incomes through delivery of produce to 
agroprocessors or commercial farmers. However, in the case of canneries in Mushandike (see 
Dzingirai), contracts are observed to be verbal, vague on terms of payment, and sometimes 
“exploitative”.
8 In the case of the green tea-leaf collection system in Honde valley (see 
Mtisi), contracts are formal but are ambiguous in content, and are sometimes ignored or 
disregarded when it suits the interest of the agroprocessor.
9 Indeed, according to Hungwe (see 
perspective), land tenure and contract farming is sometimes insecure, but canneries can also 
be exploitative because smallholders lack alternative market opportunities. Beyond a robust 
legal system through which injury can be addressed through court of law, factor and product 
markets must be broadened and better integrated to provide these opportunities.
10  
 
What is required is not strictly replacement of the large-scale commercial sector by 
smallholders on the basis of formal resettlement models that lock-in land sizes, but rather an 
agrarian structure that seeks to instil integration where farmers, large or small, can right-size 
farm holdings and resource imbalances through secure and flexible land transfers (sales, 
rentals and sharecropping) and marketing contracts.
11 However, at least according to one 
                                            
7 See Hasluck who submits that leasing and sharecropping can help improve the welfare of communal 
farmers, farm workers, tenants and new land reform beneficiaries. But, tenure insecurity is 
constraining these land contracts among commercial farmers and settlers, in the former case by 
government policy shifts that continue to carve off successive pieces of farms for resettlement despite 
restraining orders, and in the latter case by boundary and ownership disputes among settlers. 
Nevertheless, leasing and sharecropping arrangements are still entered into, sometimes for mutual 
benefit (risk spreading, resource sharing, and co-responsibility for minimizing theft), absentee settlers 
leasing land back to farmers, and sharecropping arrangements being entered into between farmers and 
farm workers to avoid marketing regulations that require grain delivery to the GMB on onerous terms. 
8 For example, when the agroprocessor introduces and inappropriate new bean variety, but the tenant 
is forced to bear all the risk of crop failure (Dzingirai) 
9 For example, tenants bear the loss of deterioration in leaf quality when the agroprocessor fails to 
meet the pick-up or delivery schedules, or delivery points are too few in number or too remote to 
adequately serve the needs of outgrowers (Mtisi). 
10 Hungwe mentions IDEAA as one example of a program where key factors and markets are 
mainstreamed to secure rural livelihoods. 
11 Interestingly, Chatora observes that the model C scheme implemented after 1980 faired better than 
models A (villagized resettlement) or B (cooperative model). The Model C scheme theoretically 
incorporates a commercial core estate (typically managed by ARDA), which provided essential 
services (mechanisation, transportation, inputs and crop processing and marketing), and the settlers as 
outgrowers. While not applicable in all situations, such model (if involving private sector ownership   5 
commentator, more secure land contracts while important, should not become a mechanism 
that bolsters or preserves the monolithic structure and power of the large scale and corporate 
farming sector of the past. Can agrarian contracts unlock economic opportunity in 
Zimbabwe? Certainly yes if trust and rule of law is restored (with clear, equitable and 
enforceable contracts) and ethical standards of business are widely invoked, but as pointed 
out by Dzingirai, Mtisi, Hasluck, Nyambara and Hughes in this volume, the challenges are 
formidable. 
 
The simple truth is that government has focused so intensely on reversing the unequal 
distribution in physical land assets that it has neglected property rights in land, and without 
adequate tenure security, land is devoid of meaning. Tenure security has been undermined, 
and markets for land and bond financing have collapsed as rules are disregarded or 
selectively applied (Chigumete). It is one of the ironies of Fast Track land reform that black 
commercial farmers and women in Zimbabwe have been disadvantaged by the collapse of 
land markets and loss of agricultural markets including mortgage financing (Rugube et al, 
Petrie et al) at the same time that government has committed itself to their advancement. 
 
With economic regression has come the cry for more government controls on market 
prices and availability that in turn act to encourage “black” markets, drive up prices, and 
curtail the supply of services to new land reform beneficiaries. Government’s ability to 
provide services in turn is eroded by the shrinkage in tax revenues, limiting its ability to 
provide services or implement the regulations it has set for itself. Lack of confidence has set 
in – lack of confidence in law, legal recourse, government’s ability to manage the economy, 
and the economy’s ability to provide employment and livelihoods. The outcome is a 
downward spiral –  as the economy sinks deeper into recession, government seeks more 
controls, and more controls inevitably lead to more corruption, rights abuse, and yet more 
measures to ensure compliance that in turn lead to economic regress.  
 
                                                                                                                                        
or management, even by the former land owner) could provide an alternative development pathway 
by enabling the continued employment of farm workers (Magaramombe), maintaining an integrated 
agricultural sector, and retaining management expertise to overcome capacity constraints. 
Unfortunately, very few farms were made available to this model between 1980-89. A distant variant 
is the Farmer Development Trust established in 1994 as a joint public-private sector initiative which 
provides small holders guaranteed access to inputs and markets (i.e. tobacco) in Model A schemes.     6 
According to land reform beneficiaries, and based on anecdotal evidence in plenary 
discussions, government’s delivery of land services has been guardedly poor (Odero and 
Marimira), compounded by economic regress. This is not because government is unaware of 
the problem or is unwilling to provide assistance, but it is because resources are limited, the 
need is great, and it is therefore unable to deliver on “hefty” promises and responsibilities 
(see Gonese and Mukora). These are symptoms of an administrative economy; an economy 
where government is trying to substitute administrative allocation for market forces, and 
where too little space is provided for private sector solutions. While government may 
advance on a few fronts, with a few notable achievements, the larger concern is that it is on 
pace to lose the larger war against poverty, food insecurity and broad based development 
because of tight controls and its limited reach. 
Transition?   
There is a sense in some circles that Zimbabwe is in a state of transition from old to new, and 
that the current problems and economic malaise afflicting the country are temporary 
phenomena that will somehow be corrected with time. Indeed, something drastic had to be 
done to accelerate land redistribution (after all land acquisition and resettlement had stalled 
from the mid 1980s to the early 1990s). And, land reform is neither easy nor pretty; it is a 
messy and complex business involving decades to achieve full success. Kinsey in this volume 
describes a theoretical dip in livelihoods immediately following resettlement, followed by 
income growth and asset accumulation in subsequent years. Might then the current downward 
spiral reverse itself after 2 or 3 years with a rebound of economic growth and political 
stability? There is reason to be doubtful this will occur, not without fundamental policy 
change. And, even if the downward spiral is reversed or halted without these fundamental 
changes, it would take a long time in coming, far longer than many Zimbabweans hope or 
anticipate. There are two fundamental problems with the transition: 
 
First, as long as government is in the business of acquiring and redistributing land 
without committing to some reasonable assurance of private ownership, tenure insecurity is 
going to prevail, and as long as tenure insecurity prevails, there is going to be a long-term 
negative impact on economic growth and livelihood. Perhaps land reform is now complete, as 
stated by one participant at the conference! But another participant remarked that land is 
scarce and in short supply, and Kinsey observes that the benefits from resettlement hold for   7 
only a few decades until population pressures begin to reverse the benefits.
12 It is worthwhile 
examining the experiences of China and Ethiopia. For decades, these countries engaged in 
land redistribution programs, shuffling and reshuffling land (mainly from large landholders to 
the landless or the state) to accommodate the needs of population growth, migration, 
industrialisation and urban development. With each new generation there is again the need to 
redistribute land, and people who were once beneficiaries one day become victims as their 
land is redistributed to others. 
 
 The effects can be profound – under-investment for fear that assets accumulated 
through savings or hard work might be lost, over-investment with shoddy and haphazard 
infrastructure to demonstrate land use and strengthen land claims, or fear that the inheritance 
of one’s children is in jeopardy – all a result of tenure insecurity invoked by government 
through land redistribution programs to ensure equity, or enforcement of conditions on land 
use. As reported in the press and elsewhere, a number of relatively well-to-do or influential 
people have obtained land through Fast Track land reform, either through cash purchase, or a 
public lease or grant issued by government. While these people may hold comfort in 
becoming beneficiaries today, they are at risk tomorrow of becoming victims, unless 
government brings its programs of compulsory acquisition to closure and commits instead to 
securing land rights of all land holders, regardless of race, gender or political affiliation. 
 
  Second, it is not clear whether or not Fast Track settlers will stay on the land and 
become permanent landholders. In the peri-urban areas, Marongwe provides case study 
evidence that beneficiaries feel rooted and intend to stay.
13 But, one government official at 
the conference deemed their tenure status to be doubtful based on prevailing land use plans. 
Government outside peri-urban “squatter” settlements has assisted land reform beneficiaries 
with land occupation, but maintains the right to expropriate and reallocate the land to another 
                                            
12 Chatora observes the same phenomenon on small-scale commercial farms; three decades after 
resettlement of the original master farmers, some farms have been subdivided into sub-economical 
units. In addition, early Model A and accelerated resettlement schemes suffered from invasion by 
squatters and subdivision of arable plots when the population increased. 
13 Marongwe’s paper seems to conclude that fast-track settlers are there to stay, and however 
haphazard their settlement, there is need to upgrade their rights and begin the process of investing in 
physical infrastructure and development. As with Sukume and Roth, this paper underscores the major 
incoherencies in land use planning in Zimbabwe today; i.e. that informal settlement spearheaded by 
the executive branch of government has proceeded with abandon while administrative (municipal) 
departments maintain strict land controls on land use and development.   8 
if use or investment does not comply with conditions imposed.
14 There is also reported cases 
of absenteeism – beneficiaries after occupying land returning to the city or communal areas 
because they lack the means to put their new found land to productive use.
15 
 
Returning then to the central themes of restoring trust and securing property rights, 
the above two problems raise rather enormous policy questions. Are “land equality” and 
enforcement of “land use conditions” to be the twin pendulums hanging over the heads of all 
Zimbabwean landholders waiting to subdivide land holdings or change landholders as 
circumstances or changes in government policy dictate? Or are land and property rights to be 
secured? And from the practical standpoint of securing rights of land reform beneficiaries 
under Fast Track, to whom are they to be assigned if they are absent or non-permanent – the 
state, absentee beneficiary, the tiller, or the former commercial farmer? It is not immediately 
clear that the beneficiary (even if s/he can be identified as residing on the land) is the rightful 
landowner, and that the former landowner is 
not, in all situations. The concern is that 
government policy, whether wilfully or 
involuntarily, is positioning government to 
become the land holder of both first and last 
resort with yet more management oversight 
(for land allocations and land use) added to it’s 
already strained resource base and capabilities.   
Policy Path for Moving Forward? 
Phase 1 
If lack of trust and tenure insecurity are the 
problems, government must commit to 
stopping compulsory acquisitions, restoring 
ethical foundations for business, securing 
peace and restoring rule of law (Hasluck, 
Masendeke, Mukute). Government in addition 
                                            
14 According to Chatora, under the Commercial Farm Settlement Scheme (Tenant Scheme) persistent 
non-performers were evicted. 
15 According to Chigumete, the take-up or occupancy rate is reportedly low due to lack of beneficiary 
capacity to undertake commercial farming, their lack of secure tenure, and absence of 
institutional/market support. 
Phase 1: 
Re-establish Property Rights and 
Institutions 
†  Government commits to stopping 
compulsory acquisitions 
†  Government robustly asserts the land 
rights of all Zimbabweans irregardless 
of race, color and creed 
†  Government demonstrates 
commitment to defending and 
assuring these rights 
†  Government takes the lead & initiative 
in building and reestablishing trust 
through a deliberate policy of 
reconciliation in pursuit of peace, 
justice, and economic security 
†  National dialogue is strengthened 
among government and stakeholders 
 
 
   9 
must openly and robustly assert the land rights of all Zimbabweans regardless of race, colour 
and creed. Government must demonstrate a proactive commitment to defending these  rights 
without prejudice, both immediately and widespread. Simply decreeing law would not be 
sufficient; law (and restoration of trust) is given visible weight only through consistent and 
steadfast state assurance of rights, sustained initiative, and enforcement with legal recourse 
through a truly independent court of law. Finally, dialogue must be established or 
strengthened among stakeholders, from local to national levels; the seeds for such dialogue 
have been sown with signs of emergence (Rwafa).
16 Land policy interventions will be 
doomed to either sporadic success, stagnation or outright failure until there is faith and trust 
that government seeks to assure rights and protect institutions rather than acting to deprive 
them. 
Phase 2 
As early as possible, a comprehensive and detailed land audit (Mukute, Samuriwo) should be 
initiated by parliament with the assistance of farmer organisations that identifies for each pre-
1998 commercial farm or farmholding the following:
17 
18 
  Names of all land claimants including, as relevant, the former owner of the commercial 
farm, farmworkers, and new land reform beneficiaries (both resident and absent); 
  Size and location of their respective landholdings; and 
  Size and nature of physical assets owned or claimed. 
 
Such audit should seek to comprehensively identify all land and property claims, even if 
these claims are multiple and overlapping. It is unrealistic to expect this process to proceed 
                                            
16 Rwafa describes the Zimbabwe Joint Resettlement Initiative (ZJRI) comprised of the CFU, other 
farmers’ unions and private sector organisations that in 2001 submitted to government a proposal to 
offer 1.2 million hectares of land, resettle 20,000 settlers, withdraw litigation, and give dialogue a 
chance. Sadly, the momentum took steam, then the dialogue became irregular, inconsistent and finally 
collapsed. Nevertheless, Rwafa stresses, that the process of dialogue among all stakeholders 
regardless of race, color and political affiliation is capable of finding a home-grown solution to the 
land question. Had ZJRI been given a chance, the land redistribution program would have been more 
organized, focused and peaceful. Other similar initiatives are demonstrating constructive dialogue and 
mutual respect including the National Economic Forum, the Tri-partite Negotiating Forum, and the 
newly reconstituted Agrarian Reform Task Force. 
17 According to Samuriwo, the new land audit should reveal who is where on the land, what activities 
are being undertaken, whether the farmer is productive, and whether a single family is claiming two 
or more farms. Such audit however needs also to be accompanied by a policy framework guaranteeing 
land ownership – e.g. one-man, one-farm but subject to maximum farm size limits. 
18 According to Gasela (personal communications), the land audit must also include whether the farm 
has been legally acquired. Once rule of law has been restored, the land should belong to the holder of 
title, and there will be need for a process of rationalisation to remove land that has been allocated but   10 
quickly, but with the ample land administration machinery that exists in Zimbabwe and 
commitment, such task need not be extraordinarily lengthy, particularly if assisted by civil 
society. 
 
Once the land audit is completed, a second process of adjudication would be required 
to systematically regularise landholdings and reconcile overlapping land claims. In most 
situations, it would not be possible, desirable 
or even politically feasible to return to the pre-
1998 agrarian structure. A solution is required 
that balances the compelling needs of the 
landless (land reform beneficiaries) in 
Zimbabwe with the interests of landholders 
who wrongfully have lost land and property.
19 
Apriori, decision rules would need to be 
reached and decided upon for determining 
restitution. Then, based on facilitated 
negotiations (by civil society organisations) 
between former commercial land holders and 
new land reform beneficiaries, land reform 
proposals would need to be prepared that formally identify all landholders, demarcate their 
land holdings, identify resettlement needs, and determine the level of financial restitution 
based on pre-1998 fair market value. One shoe need not fit all! Any number of variants are 
possible, for example: 
  The former landowner may relinquish his or her remaining land in exchange for financial 
compensation, in cash or an annuity, for land willingly given up. 
  The former landowner may continue to farm privately on a smaller commercial farm, or 
may convert the farming operation into a company or equity share scheme with the owner 
and farmworkers as shareholders. 
                                                                                                                                        
“never set foot upon”, and right-sizing land holdings of beneficiaries to adjust for housing and land 
quality differences. 
19 The land question in Zimbabwe is rooted in the colonial era, where the ancestral lands of black 
Zimbabweans were enclosed and expropriated without compensation by the former colonial 
government. With this history comes a moral obligation of the international community to help 
redress this historical wrong through meaningful land reform, but also to restore the rights of 
commercial farmers, both black and white, most of whom bought their properties with cash and long-
term mortgage financing. 
Phase 2: 
Land Rights Validation & Restitution 
†  Donors begin to recommit funds as 
rule of law is restored 
†  Land restitution process is 
implemented to restore invalid 
expropriations with recourse to (land 
claims) court. Redress paid through 
return of land or compensation 
†  Land Compensation Fund is 
established by donors to compensate 
owners, black and white, for land lost 
†  Land audits used to confirm 
beneficiary populations and their 
entitlements to help formalize claims 
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  Land reform beneficiaries may receive only land, or, instead of, or in addition to, may be 
offered a state-funded beneficiary grant (size to be determined) that enables him or her to 
give up the land for life in the city, return to communal areas, or for investment on the 
farm.
20 
 
A Land (Acquisition) Compensation Fund ought to be established by donors to 
compensate farmers, both black and white, for land lost through Fast Track land reform since 
1998.
21 It was unreasonable in 1998 for donors and multi-lateral organisations to place the 
burden of land acquisition solely or even predominantly upon Zimbabweans via income 
transfers or taxation.
22 During this phase, donors would begin to recommit funds for 
restitution and resettlement as rule of law is restored.  
 
Why should parties be willing to work toward a negotiated solution? First, a 3-5 year 
window might be established, within which the former land owner would be eligible for legal 
recourse and restitution, and the land reform beneficiary would be eligible for secure land 
rights (via title); proposals not submitted within this window would lapse in priority. There 
are other policy options: 1) maintain ceilings on farm numbers or farm size; 2) impose a 
highly progressive tax structure to encourage subdivisions; or 3) provide tax deferments to 
farms that willingly give land to farmworkers or beneficiaries. However, the economic 
malaise of the recent past provides the most cogent evidence of the failure to overcome the 
present political crisis and achieve both meaningful land reform and return to political 
stability and peaceful coexistence. It is doubtful that this outcome could be achieved without 
strong government endorsement and leadership.  
  Phase 3 
A number of practices raise the disturbing prospect of government becoming the repository 
of land in Zimbabwe. It is not unusual for government to be the owner of last resort (as in the 
case of crown land). However, in the case of Zimbabwe, there is the emerging risk of 
government becoming the owner and operator of first resort, acquiring or controlling land 
                                            
20 While an option, careful attention would need to be given to implementation to ensure that land 
equity objectives are not compromised. For example, according to one commentator, such a strategy 
might be manipulated by commercial farmers, the well-to-do, or the influential, to acquire the land 
(and consolidate land holdings) while the former beneficiaries end up as the unemployed in cities or 
as squatters on the same farms. 
21 Alternatively, financing might be obtained through long-term mortgages on concessionary terms. 
22 According to Rogier Van den Brink and John Bruce (personal communications), the World Bank 
has recently changed its policy and is now able to finance land purchases. The US government also   12 
through compulsory acquisition (Rugube et al). The government of Zimbabwe despite 20 
years of resettlement has failed to provide beneficiaries with secure land rights by title, lease 
or otherwise. As land is acquired or leased, government reserves the right to retake 
possession of the land, if the holder does not abide by the terms of the lease. As government 
acquires land through compulsory acquisition, land is held in stock until it can be 
redistributed either through public lease or sale.
23 Government continues to maintain land 
ownership through ARDA estates, and in the maintenance of state land. 
 
Government should convert all 
contested state land into 99-year leases that 
are automatically renewable. If there is 
concern about land speculation, a 3-5 year 
moratorium on land transfer might be 
imposed to ensure that beneficiaries are intent 
on farming, and that once intent is 
demonstrated, the land is sold to the lessee on 
a comparable market value with funding from 
cash or banking institutions.
24 The lessee may 
be given a deed of transfer or a 99-year lease. 
What is important, however, is that the lease 
be transferable and automatically renewable; 
at the end of the lease period, it should be at 
the landholder’s discretion how the land is 
disposed. 
   
During this phase, the emphasis should be on liberalising the land market, in 
particular, substantially easing sub-division regulations that constrain the downsizing of 
                                                                                                                                        
made provision for financing land purchases under the Zimbabwe Democracy Act. The UK has 
financed land purchases in Zimbabwe since the 1980s. 
23 As noted by Chigumete, current lease agreements are not a reasonable substitute for title deeds that 
encourage financial institutions to lend to farmers. Such is not possible as land formerly locked in the 
commercial farming sector is now locked in the hands of the state on terms that disable beneficiaries 
from trading in land. Reforms are handled by the political establishment to the exclusion of the private 
sector. Financial institutions in turn have rolled back support, leaving government as the sole supplier 
of inputs and support to resettlement farmers. 
Phase 3: 
Re-vitalize Land Markets 
†  Government converts all uncontested 
state land into permanent leases: 
  3-5 year moratorium to 
demonstrate land use 
  Land sold to lessee on 
comparable market value 
  Lessee given title or a 99-year 
lease 
  Leases transferable and 
automatically renewable 
†  Liberalize markets (subdivision, deeds 
and surveying transactions costs, 
special credit facilities) 
†  Formal leasing law to protect rights of 
lessors & lessees 
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farms (Sukume and Roth), converting public land into privately held leases or grants (based 
on fair market value) that are easily transferable at low cost (Rugube et al), injecting capital 
into the financial system, and designing special credit facilities (Lyne and Darroch) that help 
to broaden the poor’s access to resources and markets. This phase might also include the 
development of a formal leasing law that protects the interests of both lessees and lessors. All 
these measures are intended to restore and strengthen trust in land and financial market 
transactions in Zimbabwe.
25 
Phase 4 
The large volume of land units created under Fast Track has put severe strain on the 
capacity of land and agricultural institutions to provide land services which are key to 
unlocking the expansion of land markets (Chigumete).
26 According to Chigumete, a 
reengineering process is needed that removes systemic institutional inertia and invokes a new 
atmosphere of higher quality, lower cost, and speedy delivery of land to stabilise land tenure. 
Is devolution the answer? There does not appear to be consensus on this issue. Jacobs and 
Chavunduka seem doubtful on the feasibility of devolving land administration in Zimbabwe, 
while Maminine urges the need for it and Chatiza develops an organisational framework 
based on Botswana’s Land Board model to implement it. Mamimine’s paper seems cautious 
about including chiefs in land administration, while Chatiza’s paper seems to want to 
formalise, even enhance, their role. Ndlovu and Mufema also see the need for 
decentralisation and capacity strengthening to deepen agrarian reform, but it is the Rural 
District Councils (not Land Boards as in Chatiza’s case) that are the principle agents for 
change. Central government however has not been inclined to devolve resources or decision 
making power to the RDCs (Chatiza, Kuwanda, Mamimine), which casts doubt on whether it 
                                                                                                                                        
24 It is possible, even likely, that some new beneficiaries will lack credit worthiness warranting the 
need for a special credit facility that engenders financial discipline and capacitates the poor. 
25 Mlalazi asserts that there is no proof that subdivision regulations discourage subdivision 
applications, constrain private land market transactions, or prevent the downsizing of farms. Rather, 
Zimbabwe is relatively well-planned by developing country standards because of land use controls 
such as subdivision regulations. After all, the major cry against Fast Track resettlement today is that 
occupation preceded planning and infrastructural development. Nevertheless, Mlalazi too questions 
the use of viability assessments for predicating subdivision decisions both because of the income 
norms used and “business plans not worth the ink they are written with.” 
26 According to Chigumete, functions such as land identification, land planning and information, and 
land survey and registration are affected by severe capacity constraints. There is lack of qualified or 
experienced personnel, duplication of functions, and lack of coordination and autonomy. Institutions 
are housed in different ministries, operate disharmoniously, are fast losing capacity and institutional 
memory, and have too few resources to support land and agrarian reform. Tax revenues have declined 
as commercial farming and agrarian structures have withered.   14 
would be inclined to do so for Land Boards (and the new costs entailed in their 
administration) in the future.
27 
28 
 
In many instances, it remains 
unclear what is being devolved in terms of 
specific functions and responsibilities. It is 
interesting that the Deeds Registry and 
Land Survey offices which appear so 
prominent in papers elsewhere in this 
volume (Mugabe and Magaya, Rugube et 
al, Sukume and Roth) seem to fade away 
in discourse about devolution in this 
volume. Whatever form devolution takes, 
it should not be seen as simply 
decentralisation of government 
administrative functions to local areas, but 
in addition, should provide formal 
mechanisms for increasing stakeholder 
participation in decision making at all 
levels. And despite the largesse of the 
current land administration bureaucracy in 
Zimbabwe, there are others who feel it is 
Zimbabwe’s “sacred-cow” that should be 
left to stroll along as is. 
 
The central problem is that Fast Track land reform and resettlement has so radically 
shifted the terrain of agrarian structure and development needs in Zimbabwe, that the old 
bureaucracy at times seem outmoded given present day realities, while the mountains of new 
demands dictated by beneficiaries seem insurmountable. The current bureaucracy of land 
                                            
27 Kuwanda asserts there are problems of sustaining infrastructure because it is handed over to RDCs 
who can neither expand nor maintain it, and there is no meaningful financial transfer from Central 
government to assist with the work. Resettlement farmers appear to be unwilling or unable to pay 
levies to the Councils, with the result that infrastructure is poorly maintained. 
Phase 4: 
Devolve Land Administration 
†  Establish a Land Commission at the 
national level to coordinate land 
policy development comprised of both 
government and civil-society interests 
†  Confer upon this commission broad 
powers to identify pathways and 
mechanisms for devolving land 
administration through further 
consultation 
†  Conduct a cost-benefit analysis of the 
land bureaucracy to identify 
inefficiencies, overlaps and gaps and 
advise concrete changes for enhancing 
the efficiency of the public sector 
†  Decide upon appropriate 
organisational mechanisms for 
securing land rights in rural areas 
†  Avoid the temptation to devolve at the 
expense of coherency. Keep changes 
modest and gradual to minimise the 
risk of further worsening delivery of 
land services in the short-run 
†  Devolve land functions if they are cost 
reducing or affordable on the basis of 
tax levies in rural areas 
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administration seems to be coping at best and overwhelmed at worst by the immensity of the 
present rural development challenge. While the present day realities are asking ever more of 
government to deliver, government’s resources will remain tight both due to constrained tax 
revenues and tight global demand for donor funding. Indeed, far too many papers in this 
volume are asking government (and civil society) to do more, when the harsh reality is that 
resources are likely to be sufficient only for much less. 
 
So what is the appropriate development path for land administration in Zimbabwe? In 
short, it’s difficult to say! There is need for both downsizing (in areas related to state 
management of agricultural land or farms, subdivision policy, land market controls, and 
oversight and development of land use planning), upsizing (in areas related to beneficiary 
support services and infrastructural development), and economising (right-sizing government 
supply of services commensurate with demand for land services and the new fiscal order). A 
number of options are worth considering. Establish a land commission under the National 
Economic Forum with responsibility for coordinating, managing or overseeing the land 
policy framework, land administration, Land (Acquisition) Compensation Fund, Land 
Resettlement Fund, and donor funding. This Commission in addition would be responsible 
for a process of consultation that might identify pathways for devolution and appropriate 
organisational forms in rural areas, whether they be land boards, RDCs, or some combination 
of both. Changes in land administration should be made commensurate with adequate review 
of  cost and effectiveness, and be kept modest, to ensure that coherency of land 
administration and present delivery is not compromised by the urge to devolve. Finally 
consider instituting a joint government, civil-society forum that over time works on reducing 
tensions, and increases the effectiveness of partnership between the two groups based on 
principles of mutual respect, transparency and inclusivity. However, according to Masendeke, 
this focus on devolution should not detract us from the point that land institutions operate 
better when there is a functioning and efficient central government, for it is the state that must 
uphold rule of law, assure rights, and spearhead good governance. 
Community-Led Land Development 
A private land market involving purchases and sales will generally not benefit the poor 
because they are incapacitated through lack of assets to purchase land, or to mobilise 
                                                                                                                                        
28 Mamimini in particular documents the inclination of civil servants in rural land administration to be 
upwardly accountable to their superiors to the neglect of their clientele; “…transparency is one major   16 
resources on terms that are competitive with the non-poor. There is a great need to overcome 
capacity constraints in the communal and resettlement sectors.
29 As advised by Mundeiri, 
Kuwanda,
 30  Mukute, among others, training and extension is needed on social skills, 
business and farm management, development and implementation of business plans, 
marketing, maintenance of equipment, and soil and water conservation via both experiential 
and formal learning. Development of social capital is needed to help new settlers articulate 
demands, be cognisant of their rights, and empower them to action. But as noted by Dube, 
resettled farmers under the Zvishavane Water Project are making impressive progress with 
limited resources based on “self-help and self-reliance”; it is this dynamic that can and should 
be mobilised and expanded upon through support and facilitation provided by government 
and civil-society organisations. 
 
  As government seem inclined to 
recommend in 1998, efforts should be 
undertaken to upgrade land entitlements of 
beneficiaries with leasehold title (GOZ 1998); 
these should be of sufficiently long-term 
duration and be automatically renewable and 
transferable to secure land rights. In addition 
to the Land (Acquisition) Compensation fund 
mentioned earlier, the government might 
consider establishing a Land Resettlement 
Fund with donor funding based on principles 
of 1) awarding contracts to RDC’s and civil 
society organisations who are working with 
beneficiaries to up grade land and 
infrastructure, guided by beneficiary choice 
not type of resettlement model. The emphasis given to extension needs and services is 
warranted (Kuwanda, Mundeiri, Ndlovu and Mufema), but far too little attention has been 
                                                                                                                                        
casualty of self-serving agents…in central government.” 
29 These same constraints apply to the water sector where a weak and diffuse small- to medium-scale 
black farming sector is ill-equipped and inappropriately positioned to effectively assume their role in 
the country’s new water policy because of capacity constraints and difficulties in devolving water 
rights, water planning and management (see Derman and Gonese). 
Community-Led Land Development 
†  Upgrade land rights (after moratorium) 
with 30-year leases, automatically 
renewable, and transferable 
†  Establish land acquisition and 
resettlement fund with donor funding  
†  Award contracts to NGOs or RDCs 
working on behalf of beneficiaries to 
invest in human, physical and social 
capital while emphasizing beneficiary 
choice not type of resettlement model 
†  Establish a joint government CSO 
forum to determine mechanisms of 
sharing tasks and responsibilities to 
better assist beneficiaries 
†  Government would remain responsible 
for public infrastructure, agricultural 
extension and government-assisted 
land resettlement 
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given to empowering beneficiaries and communities to assert their preferences outside the 
rubric of government formal resettlement models (Masendeke, Mukute).  
Chronology 
Throughout these phases, government would remain responsible for public infrastructure and 
government assisted land resettlement and development. However, there is need for a major 
policy change. The former phases identify snapshots of policy priorities and 
recommendations. However, there also ought to be a certain chronology that ties these pieces 
together in a carefully constructed sequence. As noted earlier in the paper, the first phase 
requires reestablishing trust and rule of law, for it provides the necessary conditions for 
subsequent phases. In addition, donor funding is not likely to be forthcoming until rule of law 
is restored. Progress with initiating or advancing land policy and administration in subsequent 
stages is likely to hinge on how quickly and satisfactorily Phase one is implemented. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Once, there is commitment to rebuild and strengthen institutions governing property 
rights, emphasis should probably be placed on land rights validation and restitution. Next 
there is need to revitalise land markets and finally devolve land administration. Caution is 
advised against making radical structural changes in land administration in the short-run to 
                                                                                                                                        
30 Past attempts at resettlement according to Kuwanda focused largely on material improvements 
(roads, water) at the expense of human capital and social capital development.  
Figure 1: 
Land Policy Reform Chronology 
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minimise the risk of collapse at the very time that the public sector focus on resolving 
macroeconomic imbalances and the agrarian decline are tantamount. Devolution however is 
advised once political and economic stability is regained, and time and care have been given 
to the appropriate mechanisms. 
 
If these measures are put in place, one ought to see the reemergence of land valuations 
as land markets stabilise, which in turn would enable financial institutions once again to 
inject financial capital into rural areas. Views have been expressed elsewhere in this volume 
(see Murota for example) that government parastatals will provide this role and have been 
and will continue to inject capital for rural development. However, government cannot do 
this on a scale large enough to improve the livelihoods of people substantially. As in South 
Africa, private sector solutions can be designed whereby private sector and donor funding 
could enter with special credit facilities targeted to the poor that help small holders minimise 
risk and defer payments that offset liquidity constraints until macroeconomic stability is 
restored (see Lyne and Darroch).  
Conclusions 
This paper has in essence proposed the need for a simpler land bureaucracy in Zimbabwe that 
gives greater space to, and places greater reliance on, private sector solutions as principles for 
moving forward. There is no reason to believe that the ideas proposed here are the first-best 
policy path; critical comments provided by a number of commentators (Mlalazi, Samuriwo) 
suggest that it may not. However, even critics are in agreement that more dialogue not less is 
needed, and that such dialogue is possible despite big ideological differences. Nevertheless, it 
is advised that all delegates again reconsider the three crosscutting themes or issues laid out 
earlier in the paper in order to reshape a land policy that is more effective in implementation 
– i.e. 1) incoherent policy; 2) lack of trust; and  3) transitional problems. Finding solutions 
that overcome these constraints will help to both accelerate the land reform program and 
begin to find a middle ground around which a land policy consensus can emerge.  
   19 
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